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The Turkic people known as Uyghur will most likely be
in the same situation at the beginning of the next mille-
nium as they have been for most of this one: an internal-
ly colonized people, subject to the Chinese nation-state.
How this came to be and how it might cease to be so is
the subject of this article. I argue that it is through the
model of internal colonialism that we might begin to
understand how it is the Uyghur, and other indigenous
peoples such as Tibetans, now labelled as Ôminority
nationalities,Õ have been turned into Ôinternal colonial
subjectsÕ despite being indigenous peoples in lands
they once called their own. Through initial occupation,
gradual integration through immigration, and finally
ÔminoritizationÕ as a result of nationality policy, the
Uyghur (and perhaps many others like them) have been
internally colonized by the Chinese state.
Internal Colonialism
and ChinaÕs Uyghur
Muslim Minority
The categorization and taxonomization of all
levels of Chinese society, from political econo-
my, to class, to gender, to religion, to ethnicity
and nationality represents a wide-ranging and
ongoing project of internal colonialism.
Though now long subsided, the debate pro-
voked by Michael HechterÕs (1976) history,
Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British
National Development, 1536-1966, led scholars
to consider applying HechterÕs model to many
other societies beyond England and Ireland.
Hechter suggests that the channelling of cer-
tain peoples into Ôhierarchical cultural divisions
of laborÕ under colonial administrations led to
the development of ethnic identities which
superseded class. This Ôinternal colonialismÕ is
predicated upon the unequal rates of exchange
between the urban power-centres and the
peripheral, often ethnic, hinterlands. In his
study of ÔThe Celtic Fringe,Õ Hechter traces the
national development of the post-colonial
British state, as though these areas were still
under economic colonial exploitation. 
Internal colonialism was found to be applica-
ble to South Africa, Thailand, Sudan, Wales, Brit-
tany, Quebec, Austria-Hungary (as it was for-
merly), Scotland, Bangladesh, Cherokee Native
Americans, Chicanos in America, the Palestini-
ans in Israel, and the original intent behind and
reason for the success of StalinÕs nationalities
policy in the Soviet Union (Gouldner 1978:11-
14). The majority of these examples stress the
exploitation of the many ethnics, who are less
culturally literate in the dominant tradition, by
the few urban power elite who control access
to and distribution of capital. Interestingly,
though the theory was later criticized and gen-
erally abandoned for being too general and too
widely applicable, it was never applied to
China. It is quite ironic that while the PeopleÕs
Republic was founded on an Ôanti-imperial
nationalismÕ (Friedman 1994), in the current
postcolonial world, at a time when most
nations are losing territory rather than recover-
ing it, China is busily making good its claims on
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Spratleys, as well
as jealously guarding its border territories.
Uyghur Ethnogenesis and
Internal Colonialism
Chinese histories notwithstanding, every
Uyghur firmly believes that their ancestors
were the indigenous people of the Tarim basin,
now known as Xinjiang. The Uyghur were rec-
ognized as a nationality in the 1930s in Xinjiang
under a Soviet-influenced policy of nationality
recognition that contributed to a widespread
acceptance today of continuity with the
ancient Uyghur kingdom and their eventual
ÔethnogenesisÕ as a bona fide nationality. While
rebellions by Yakub Beg in the late 19th centu-
ry, and the short-lived establishments of the
Eastern Turkestan Republics (TIRET) in Kashgar
in 1933 and Yining in 1944, indicated Uyghur
attempts at resisting expanding Chinese colo-
nialism, these efforts failed just as those of the
Uzbeks and Tadjiks in Czarist and Soviet Central
Asia. 
ÔMinoritizationÕ of the Uyghur became objec-
tified when they were recognized by the Chi-
nese state in 1950 as the Uyghur nationality,
and the region was recognized as the Uyghur
Autonomous Region in 1956. Chinese practices
of Ôintegration through immigrationÕ has meant
the in-migration of Han Chinese since the
1950s, with populations increasing from an esti-
mated 5 percent in 1940 to 38 percent in 1990.
They then become known not as an indigenous
people attached to a region once their own, but
one of 55 minority nationalities in China, with a
documented population of 7.2 million in 1990
(with 98 percent, or 7.1 million in Xinjiang
alone). The Uyghurs are one of ten mainly Mus-
lim nationalities, with a total Muslim population
in China of nearly 20 million. The expropriation
of XinjiangÕs vast mineral and petrochemical
resources, with processing of petroleum prod-
ucts in the interior, primarily Lanzhou, and sold
on the international market (with revenues to
Xinjiang based on domestic prices) further fits
the internal colonialism model (see Dorian, Wig-
dortz, Gladney 1997). Finally, the development
of the tourist industry in the region as a Ôsilk
roadÕ destination follows the line of touristic
development in the minority areas that Oakes
(1995) has also analysed as the results of Ôinter-
nal colonialismÕ in the Southwest. The con-
structed indigeneity of the Uyghur poses an
alternative to Chinese historiographies of the
region, which is consonant with ÔinternalÕ colo-
nizing powers seeking to assert authority in a
region not previously their own. 
Chinese Nationalism and its
Implications for Minorities
After denying them for decades and stressing
instead ChinaÕs Ônational unity,Õ official reports
have recently detailed Tibetan and Muslim
conflicts in the border regions of Tibet, Yun-
nan, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia.
With the March 7, 1997 bus bombings in Bei-
jing, widely attributed (though never verified)
to Uyghur separatists, coupled with the
Urumqi bus bombings on the day of Deng
XiaopingÕs 1997 memorial on February 25
(killing nine people), Beijing can no longer
keep them secret. The Yining (Ghulja) uprising
from February 2-7, 1997 that left at least twen-
ty-five dead and hundreds injured and arrest-
ed, has been heavily covered by the worldÕs
media. This distinguishes the last few events
from on-going problems in the region in the
mid-1980s that have previously met with little
media coverage. 
The government responded with a host of
random arrests and new policy announce-
ments. In Spring 1998, the National Peoples
Congress passed a New Criminal Law that
redefined Ôcounter-revolutionaryÕ crimes to be
Ôcrimes against the stateÕ, liable to severe
prison terms and even execution. Included in
Ôcrimes against the stateÕ were any actions con-
sidered to involve Ôethnic discriminationÕ or
Ôstirring up anti-ethnic sentiment.Õ Many
human rights activists have argued that this is
a thinly veiled attempt to criminalize ÔpoliticalÕ
actions and to make them appear as illegal as
traffic violations, supporting ChinaÕs claims
that it holds Ôno political prisoners.Õ Since any
minority activity could be regarded as stirring
Ôanti-ethnic feeling,Õ many ethnic activists are
concerned that the New Criminal Law will be
easily turned against them. At the same time,
Han Chinese who stir up ethnic problems can
also be arrested.
Chinese authorities are correct in their
assumption that increasing international atten-
tion to the plight of indigenous border peoples
has put pressure on the regions. Notably, the
chair of the Unrepresented Nations and PeopleÕs
Organization (UNPO) based in the Hague is the
Uyghur, Erkin Alptekin, son of the Uyghur
Nationalist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin. There are
at least five international organizations working
for the independence of Xinjiang, known as East-
ern Turkestan, and based in Amsterdam,
Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, and New York.
Clearly, with Xinjiang representing the last Mus-
lim region under Communism, Chinese authori-
ties have more to be concerned about than just
international support for Tibetan independence. 
Internal Colonialism and
Muslim Separatism
Practically speaking, China is not threatened
in the near future by the loss of its Ôinternal
colonies.Õ Such as they are, ChinaÕs separatists
are small in number, poorly equipped, loosely
linked, and vastly out-gunned by the PeopleÕs
Liberation Army and PeopleÕs Police. Local sup-
port for separatist activities, particularly in Xin-
jiang, is ambivalent and ambiguous at best,
given the economic disparity between these
regions and their foreign neighbours, which are
generally much poorer and in some cases such
as Tadjikistan, riven by civil war. Memories in the
region are strong of mass starvation and wide-
spread destruction during the Sino-Japanese
and civil war in the first half of this century, not
to mention the chaotic horrors of the Cultural
Revolution. ChinaÕs economic progress is an
important check on Uyghur secessionism: the
nearby alternatives are still not that enviable.
International support for Tibetan causes has
done little to shake BeijingÕs grip on the region.
Many local activists are calling not for complete
separatism or real independence, but more
often issues express concerns over environmen-
tal degradation, anti-nuclear testing, religious
freedom, over-taxation, and recently imposed
limits on child bearing. Many ethnic leaders are
simply calling for ÔrealÕ autonomy according to
Chinese law for the five Autonomous Regions
that are each led by First Party Secretaries who
are all Han Chinese controlled by Beijing.
Recent moves suggest efforts to promote Chi-
nese nationalism as a Ôunifying ideologyÕ that
will prove more attractive than communism and
more manageable than capitalism. By highlight-
ing separatist threats and external intervention,
China can divert attention away from its own
domestic instabilities of natural disasters (espe-
cially the recent flooding), economic crises (such
as the Asian economic downturns drag on
ChinaÕs currency), rising inflation, increased
income disparity, displaced Ôfloating popula-
tions,Õ Hong Kong integration, Taiwan reunifica-
tion, and the other many internal and external
problems facing Jiang ZeminÕs government. As
Bruce Kapferer has noted, nationalism Ômakes
the political religious.Õ This is perhaps why reli-
giously-based nationalisms, like Islamic Funda-
mentalism and Tibetan Buddhism, are targeted
by Beijing, while the rise of shamanism and pop-
ular religion goes unchecked. At the same time,
a firm lid on Muslim activism in China sends a
message to foreign Muslim militant organiza-
tions to stay out of ChinaÕs internal affairs, and
the Taliban to stay well within their Afghan bor-
ders. In a July 1994 interview with IranÕs former
ambassador to China in Tehran, I was told that
Iran would never intervene in a Muslim crack-
down in China, despite its support for the train-
ing of Kubrawiyyah Sufi Imams from Gansu and
close foreign relations with China.
In a recent visit to the U.S., Defense Minister
Chi Haotian, declared: ÔWe hope to see a peace-
ful settlement [regarding Taiwan] yet refuse to
renounce the use of force Ð The entire Chinese
history shows that whoever splits the mother-
land will end up condemned by history.Õ This fol-
lows the new Chinese History Project launched
by Song Jian, Minister of Science and Technolo-
gy, aimed at writing a new chronology of China.
In a Science and Technology Daily editorial, pub-
lished May 17, 1997, Song Jian stated that the
projectÕs goal was to demonstrate its 6,000 year
Ôunbroken, unilinealÕ development. ÔUnlike those
in Egypt, Babylon and India,Õ Song declared, Ôthe
Chinese civilization has lasted for 5,000 years
without a break.Õ The project, to be completed
by October 1, 1999, clearly will take a dim view of
anyone accused of separatism. As long as Mus-
lim activism is regarded as ÔseparatismÕ, it will be
seen not only as going against ChinaÕs national
destiny, but against history itself. Xinjiang, in this
scenario, becomes just one of many former
internal colonies to be dissolved into the
advancing Chinese state, rather than the ances-
tral home known to the Uyghurs as Uyghuristan.
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